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Organizations are essential to develop legal institutions such as the right to health. 
However, when regulatory decisions are made by political organizations, whose decisions 
are not consistent over time and depend on an electoral cycle, regulation becomes 
uncertain and non-technical. This problem of commitment and the technical nature of law 
require an equally qualified response: organizations that are more politically neutral and 
independent of the Executive, rational-deliberative and accountable to the public. 
 
2 The institutional theory and the protection of rights 
 
Talking about effectiveness of rights implies a progressive reduction of uncertainty and 
the predictability of regulator’s decisions. According to North1 it is the major role of 
institutions, by founding a stable structure to human interaction. Institutions define and 
limit the set of choices of individuals and create an institutional framework composed by 
the organizations developed as a consequence. 
A distinction between institutions and organizations is imperative to understand the 
relation between a legal construct and the created organs and procedures that regulate 
their functioning and implementation. Thus, the protection of a concrete interest is 
configured by a legislative decision and subsequently ‘organ-ized’, it means, positivized 
through its own organs and procedures2. From the economic neo-institutionalism, there 
is a clear difference between institutions and organizations, because “institutions are the 
rules” – a framework of objectives and means – “and organizations are the players” 
interacting to reach them3. 
Institutions are possible though the establishment of organizations through a symbiotic 
relationship in which organizations are institutional change agents. They structure social 
life, reduce transactional and informational costs, and reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, 
organizational theories consider that effectiveness is a consequence of organizational 
 
1 North, 1990. 
2 Hauriou, 1968. 
3 North, 1990, p. 4. 
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structure4. According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights5, ‘the 
highest attainable standard of health’ to every person is the aim of every health system, 
which is based on a minimum. It is possible if right-to-health legal organizations that 
regulate and enforce it, and at the same time become institutional determinants of its 
effectiveness. 
In summary, effectiveness largely depends on the existence of organizations with 
regulatory powers, ruled by procedures to operationalize these institutional aims, which 
tend to be vague and open-ended. Therefore, procedures in regulatory organizations that 
protect fundamental rights reflect more specific and actual operations representing 
intermediate or supporting goals with an intrinsic value and substantial effects regarding 
the grant of rights and its guarantee. 
 
3 The notion of effectiveness of a right 
 
Organizations are essential to enforce legal institutions, but also the absence of 
unreasonable limitations to exercise them and the existence of procedures to protect them. 
This is the concept of effective protection of rights, the so-called “hard core” of rights 
against which any restriction can make the right inapplicable or void of content.   
From a formal perspective, effectiveness is equivalent to the attainment of the Principal’ 
goals in a mandate relation6 – namely, constituencies, legislators, states, international 
organizations and the institutions engaged in the recognition of rights –, whose guarantor 
agent is in this case the regulator. As a result, a goal will be effectively accomplished if 
there are enough evidences of the enjoyment of the right in the health system. 
Effectiveness is associated to the capability of the regulatory system to produce the 
outcome of turning the human right into an enforced legal right. This goal-based approach 
departs from legally established goals following Principal’s preferences developed by 
regulation in the administrative level. 
 
4 Scott, 2002. 
5 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2000. 
6 Shany, 2014. 
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According to the international human rights doctrine, effectiveness is a principle 
according to which the substantive and procedural rules related to the objective obligation 
of protection of rights prevail over any restriction of the State7 under the effect utile 
premise. 
Under these approaches, compliance is an indicator of the effectiveness of regulation and 
normative impact is its ultimate proxy8. Norm-compliance assesses the performance of 
an organization by reference to an objective measure, e.g., the number of solved inter-
partes conflicts (in exercise of quasi-jurisdictional functions) or the number of regulations 
to guarantee the right. These proxies do not ignore that legal rules are used as regulatory 
tools that “may secure other ends in particular ‘best practice’ or indeed a ‘gold plating’ 
of the legal provisions”9, but they are useful to have a proxy measure to find correlations 
and facilitate the analysis.  
This effectiveness assessment measures the absence of legal uncertainty derived from 
ambivalence, lack of clearness, ambiguity of legal precepts or the lack of ex-post 
implementation accountability10. Subsequently, the more explicit the goal, the easier will 
be measuring its accomplishment.  
However, effectiveness of rights depends also on several socio-legal factors. In the case 
of right to health, public health scholars establish some prerequisites for health (peace, 
shelter, education, food, income, a stable ecosystem, sustainable resources, social justice 
and equity), determinants of health (employment and working conditions, physical and 
social environments, biology and genetic endowment, health practices, healthy child 
development and health services) and social determinants of health (social-class health 
gradient, early life, social exclusion, work, transport and personal behavior), some 
overlapping the others11. Education, sustainable resources, social justice, employment 
and working conditions, health services, etc., depend to a large extent on the existence of 
legal provisions that foster and protect them through institutions with specific 
characteristics that become determinants of the effectiveness of the right. 
 
7 Cançado Trindade, 2003. 
8 Shany, 2014. 
9 Amodu, 2008, p. 5. 
10 Baker, 2016. 
11 Raphael, 2003. 
5 
 
From the legal perspective, it is perhaps more useful to study the factors immediately 
controllable by law (institutions and norms) as causes of effectiveness of a right, rather 
than labelling other mediate factors not directly controllable by law (e.g., early life, 
biology or ecosystem aspects). This approach focuses on the determinants of health not 
object of the public health research, specifically the institutional determinants, namely, 
the functioning of the regulatory institutions, their legal design, nature, attributes, and 
regime of accountability. 
From the institutional viewpoint, effectiveness of rights requires a partnership between 
the authorities to implement rights in their day-to-day decision-making12. According to 
the Paris Principles, the pragmatic implementation of rights precepts depends on 
harmonization of national legislation and regulation, through a legal guarantee for the 
independence of the institutions that ensure human rights implementation13. This 
independence from the government and the regulatees has an impact on the legitimacy of 
the regulator, because although it appears to be a mere formal attribute, it has a substantial 
connotation regarding its capacity to guarantee the rule enforcement. 
 
3.1 Effectiveness of rights and time-consistent regulation 
 
It is possible to assert that the health care regulator’s aim is the effectiveness of the right 
to health. It is technically different to state that the last aim of the system is to guarantee 
health as the ‘right to not to be sick’, which is a legally impossible objective. Under this 
approach, this right may be understood as (a) to access to healthcare services; (b) to obtain 
from the State certain measures to protect and promote public health, environment and 
safety, and (c) to not to be injured by any public or private person14.  
Since the regulator’s last aim is to protect health and finally realizing the right to health, 
the next step is to delimit its timeframe of accomplishment. It requires adopting a position 
concerning the nature of the right, between a fundamental right in its full scope, or a social 
right with time and budget constraints related to an alleged programmatic content. An 
increasing doctrinal agreement has been reached related to the nature of the right to health 
 
12 Feldman, 2002. 
13 International Conference on Cataloguing Principles, 1963. 
14 Lema Añón, 2010. 
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as a fundamental right – although Alexy prefers to call it a ‘social fundamental right’15. 
It settles and overcomes the limited conception of the right as a ‘reservation of the 
possible’ that commits State’s activities to protect the right, to budget availability, 
convenience, and political opportunism16. Considering the right to health a fundamental 
right has important consequences because it prevents that political discretion and electoral 
cycles condition its legal enforceability and availability. These factors undermine the 
legal right status of health and as far as the ultimate end of a ‘fundamental right’ category 
is to displace politics from Law17, and the timeframe for its accomplishment is not 
associated with public policy programs or social policy budgets dependent on political 
discretion. Contrary to a traditional social right perspective which has forced to divide the 
concept of legal enforceability in justiciability and political enforceability, the 
fundamental right conception binds the public powers to implement the right in all 
legislative, executive and judicial instances through concrete measures in a reasonably 
brief period. 
In conclusion, the effectiveness of the right to health is determined by the existence of an 
institutional framework and an administrative regulatory organization, bound by a time-
condition and a fixed telos. If regulatory decisions are coherent with the legally fixed 
goals, the regulator will be ‘time-consistent’ and not regressive or incoherent with the 
constitutional mandate. Time-consistency represents the execution of a prior decision 
taken in time t1 in a future time t2, evading other apparently favorable decisions in the 
present. It is theoretically a ‘perfectly rational’ decision because the agent’s preferences 
are congruent at any point in time18 and he has the incentive to not to change his 
preferences.  
However, when the regulator has wide discretional powers, its preferences may change 
according to convenience, political opportunism, and the electoral cycle. These may lead 
the politician to take non-popular – but necessary – measures at the beginning of its period 
and popular measures at the end, which appear to be favorable to its own interests but 
generates sub-optimal results contrary to the previously fixed objectives. This suggests 
that discretion and time-consistency cannot operate together unless the regulator accepted 
in advance his own weakness of will when electoral cycles or the political opportunity 
 
15 Alexy, 1997. 
16 Rodríguez-Arana, 2015. 
17 Ferrajoli, 2001. 
18 Elster, 2014. 
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emerge, based on the rational choice theory. This involves an ‘imperfect rationality’ 
theory that posits the necessity of the regulator to restrict itself regarding all the possible 
alternatives leading to sub-optimal decisions, as Ulysses decided to bound himself to the 
ship. 
The solution for the temptation to unfollow the decisions taken at t1 in a subsequent t2 
has been studied under the ‘delegation theory’ in the context of the so-called ‘rise of the 
regulatory state’. Majone considers the relationship between time and democratic process, 
concluding that the regular intervals of power incentive its arbitrary use19. A short-term 
alternation means that the effects of successful policies will come after the next election 
and will not be attributed to the current politician. Discretionary powers threaten the 
continuity of the policies and may subvert or even remove the optimal decisions taken at 
t1 by an opponent politician in a later moment t2. It creates uncertainty and ill-defined 
political property rights affecting credibility and generating a ‘commitment problem’, 
because “it is extremely difficult for democratic politicians to credibly commit 
themselves to a long-term policy”20. Kydland and Prescott have summarized the 
credibility problem establishing that fixed rules are preferable instead of discretion 
because it leads to ‘time inconsistency’21. 
However, the establishment of fixed rules is not enough if it is not accompanied by a 
change of the perverse incentives, because ‘short-termism’ derived from the political 
cycle generates the commitment problem. As a reaction, the regulatory state introduces 
an alternative to increase policy credibility through the delegation of policy-making 
powers to non-majoritarian organizations, i.e., non-democratically elected authorities 
whose decisions are not dependent on the political power in a given electoral cycle. 
In summary, the effective enforcement of fundamental rights is determined by the 
existence of fixed objectives in a corresponding term. Nevertheless, as far as politicians 
have a commitment problem that generates time-inconsistency, a non-majoritarian 
regulatory organization would reduce the uncertainty of decisions, because it is in a better 
position to guarantee they will be non-regressive. 
 
 
19 Majone, 1994. 
20 Majone, 1996, p. 2. 




3.2 Relationship between the administrative function of regulation and effectiveness 
 
At this point, we can affirm that fundamental rights alone do not ensure their own 
effective enjoyment. They cannot be seen in isolation, but they need to be supported by 
an institutional and organizational network guided under the same protective objectives22, 
supported by a regulative pillar built to influence future behaviors through rule setting, 
monitoring and sanctioning activities. Institutions rest primarily on the regulatory pillar 
by constraining and regularizing behavior through regulatory processes reflected in the 
establishment of rules, the inspection of its accomplishment and the adjudication of rights. 
This institutional framework is constituted by a normative-prescriptive function defined 
by objectives, valued ends, and the means to pursue them, a rule-setting, monitoring and 
sanctioning function and a cultural-cognitive function of creating stimuli, response, and 
compliance regarding those rules. These three pillars are accompanied by a transversal 
element that largely conditions the success of institutions: legitimacy23. It is defined as 
the social acceptability and credibility of a certain decision or entity, or a generalized 
perception that the actions of an entity are desirable or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions24, i. e., within an institutional 
framework. Legitimacy is a necessary component for the stability of the organizational 
activities that reflects the public support to the organization. Public administration’s 
legitimacy increases according to accountability and transparency.  
From the thesis advocated by Weber, the basis of the legitimacy of a system of authority 
is the probability that certain command will be obeyed for rational, traditional or 
charismatic grounds under a minimum of voluntary submission, which requires the 
control of an administrative staff, it means, the regulatory organization that exerts rule-
setting, monitoring and sanction. Weber adds that rational criteria require the authority to 
be bound by a specialized training, because “only a person who has demonstrated an 
adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of the administrative staff of such 
 
22 Tomuschat, 2008. 
23 Scott, 2008. 
24 Suchman, 1995. 
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an organized group, and hence only such persons are eligible for appointment”25. Thus, 
legitimacy is supported on the public belief that the authority has a technical qualification. 
Accordingly, Weber considers ‘a matter of principle’ that the administrative staff should 
be completely separated from the ownership of the means of production or administration, 
to make the officials accountable regarding them. It means that the proprietor-regulator-
supervisor tripod is not a legitimate model of public organization. It is not possible to 
hold an authority accountable whether it is the provider (proprietor), regulator and 
controller of the service at the same time. 
Additionally, collegiality of bodies with rationally defined functions is important to 
preserve their objectivity and the absence of influences in their actions “because a 
monocratic position is more open to personal influence and is more easily swayed, 
making it more possible to influence the administration of justice and other governmental 
activity in favor of such powerful interests”26. Thus, Weber formulates a theory of 
institutionalization of power under ‘a political separation of powers’ or a 
depersonalization of the Public Administration. 
 
4 Towards an institutional theory of fundamental rights 
 
C. Schmitt goes beyond Weber. Institutions are constitutional protections against the 
legislative, executive, or judicial suppression or distortion as far as a certain public and 
juridical normative ‘complex’ or a duly delimited and distinguishable organization 
becomes the prerequisite for the birth of an institutional guarantee. Thus, the recognition 
of legal rights is subject to the existence of a guarantee as objective protection derived 
from the inclusion of a right into the constitutional corpus27. These regulations are a 
constitutional counterweight to the Legislator’s capacity of configuration. Accordingly, 
the German doctrine defines an institution as a juridical-organizational instrument of the 
Constitution configuring a structure to protect fundamental rights. 
 
25 Weber, 1947, p. 331. 
26 Ibid., p. 406. 
27 Parejo Alfonso, 1981. 
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This institutional scope is also widely developed by Häberle28, who advocates a double 
constitutional content of fundamental rights as individual rights and institutional-
objective constitutional guarantees that configure regulated and organized spheres in life 
according to freedom principles. He considers fundamental rights as “institutes” with both 
concurrent and reciprocal individual-subjective and objective-institutional aspects that 
enable individual and collective life. He advocates that the essence of individual and 
institutional aspects of rights is the set of rules that implement them, as health system is 
an objective expression of the right to health. The institutional aspect of fundamental 
rights reinforces the individual enjoyment of rights and their institutionalization through 
the objectified “status” of the right and the creation of procedures to protect rights. 
Subsequently, the theory of institution explains the effectiveness of rights through their 
administrative institutionalization. Finally, the status activus processualis inherent to 
every fundamental right is introduced as a procedural protection before any authority. 
The institutional theory of rights is a significant element of the constitutional structure of 
the State. The recognition of the conflict as an inevitable element of the State leads to 
seek the management of it, instead of its elimination29. Therefore, one of the ultimate ends 
of the institutional structure is the effective management of the conflict. The ontological 
legitimacy of the constitutional rights will be valued by people whilst the statement of 
principles and rights is reflected in State’s daily actions, assuring consistency in the 
practice of these values. This is the essence of the constitutional status that overrules 
uncertainty, overlooking of the fundamental rights and other constitutional norms by 
convenience or political influence rationales30. 
Consequently, the institutional framework build on the Constitution will be effective if it 
awakes a popular acquiescence founded on the belief of its social and legal binding force. 
The very cornerstone of legitimacy is the public acceptance of the substantive values of 
the constitution encouraged through its institutional employment and enforcement. The 
management of conflict implies enforcing the constitutional norms through an 
institutional framework, whose consistent public practice assures the gradual acceptance 
of the regulatory organization and the norm itself. However, the conflict is permanent and 
the unifying, stabilizing effects of the legal institution will always find some resistance 
 
28 Häberle, 1997. 
29 Waldron, 1999. 
30 Carolan, 2009. 
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and debate that must be welcomed by the institution through public interaction with 
dissidents31. Institutionalization of debate and public justification has legitimizing effects 
because it leads the dissent towards the institutional structures of the State. For Rawls32 
the publicly reasoned application develops a sort of ‘public reason’, normative debate that 
mixes both publicity and rationality.  
In summary, having norm-appropriate outcomes is not a measure of effectiveness, 
because the constitutional framework is not confined to the output achievement as an 
exercise of utility, but is beyond towards building the legitimacy of the institutions and 
organizations through a public reasoning. Finally, keeping the unifying force of the 
constitution in the long-term prevents politicians or private agents of having short-term 
interests. 
 
5 Changing the paradigm: towards more technical decisions 
 
5.1 Technical reasoning leads to rational deliberation, but its implementation needs 
democratic participation  
 
The dialectic between technical and legal rationalities in health regulation raises a 
paradigm shift: the ministerial regulator is partially or totally replaced by the technical 
regulator. Most of the time the politician lacks the technical capacity to undertake an 
administrative function according to technical criteria. Therefore, the regulator 
increasingly relies on scientific committees who base their concepts on clinical 
effectiveness, scientific efficiency, or evidence-based conclusions. 
The application of this type of reasoning develops a technical discretion, characterized by 
using scientific criteria within a minimum frame of results disputable by grade, not by 
reference to chance or convenience33. This margin of appreciation is smaller, because it 
involves the interpretation of economic concepts offering mathematical and / or empirical 
 
31 Ibid., p. 10. 
32 Rawls, 2001. 
33 Desdentado, 1997. 
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alternatives and in the case of health sector, it includes medical concepts derived of 
natural science based in an empirical and scientific method founded on evidence. 
Since the subject matter of regulation follows technical parameters, the assessment of the 
facts is based on reality judgments rather than value judgments. Medicine uses empirical, 
scientific, or evidential methods to apply the available evidence from clinical trials, 
ensuring the efficiency of the use of resources by standardizing cost-effective therapies 
of proven benefit. On another hand, economy gathers economic facts from the 
observation of social reality, which despite being non-experimental data, are phenomena 
increasingly treated from a probabilistic approach by statistical inference. 
This tendency to seek more technical arguments in the justification of regulatory 
decisions is the result of the influence of technical reasoning in law and in the “rationality” 
of public policies, not only in the economic sense or in cost-effectiveness terms, but in 
objectivity as a means to avoid arbitrariness. When the regulator is legally constrained to 
use technical mechanisms – e.g., decisions based on clinical evidence –, law seeks to 
ensure optimal and measurable results to achieve the level of health proposed by the 
fundamental right. Thus, the nature of the regulated object determines the form and 
method of regulation, which subjects it to technical reasoning and transmits to law a 
specific way of acting. 
This symbiotic relationship between technical reasoning and law makes the former 
dependent on the latter as a feedback structure that regulates and controls itself, which 
leads to seek the expertise of those who are responsible for the regulated object. However, 
recognizing the existence of a fundamental right in the basis of the health sector leads 
democracy to play a major role that requires incorporating deliberation and social 
participation to the decision-making procedure. Otherwise, decisions would lack 
democratic legitimacy and even if they are based on rational-technical argumentation, 
they would not be socially embedded neither accepted by the majority. 
Hence, technical reasoning – understood as the application of knowledge and methods 
concerning science – is one of the inputs of the argumentation of regulatory decisions, 
which also gives them legitimacy, while the implementation of these measures requires 
the citizen participation to achieve its successful incorporation and acceptance. As a 
consequence, democratic rational deliberation is the scenario in which technical 
reasoning and law converge. However, deliberation reaches decisions compatible with 
13 
 
democracy and technical reasoning when there is a guarantor who knows both fields and 
is not directly influenced by actors either side, preventing to ignore the democratic 
consensus or rational-technical justifications because of certain interests of groups. This 
would be an arbitrator and guarantor whose function would be to moderate the discussion, 
surveil and decide based on the content of deliberation as a neutral party.  
However, the regulatory agency not only serves the purpose of reconciling both positions, 
but also to consider aspects of equitable and social justice distribution in addition to 
technical reasoning, to use deliberation beyond a mere instrument to reach an agreement. 
As a result, the regulatory exercise is situated between technical effectiveness and social 
equity, which could label it as a regulation for the effectiveness and protection of the 





After the explained notions, effectiveness of the right to health can be understood as (i) 
the achievement of a progressively better health based on a minimum (ii) in a reasonable 
brief and time consistent period of employment and enforcing of the right (iii) under a 
public reasoning in terms of deliberation and accountability. 
Therefore, the effectiveness assessment will depend on the achievement of the objectives 
pursued by the institutional framework of the right to health can be attributed to health 
regulator’s independence and accountability. The object of analysis is the organization 
that develops and executes the institution if the right to health through regulations to 
become health into a subjective and legal right, under the framework and aims (telos) 
designed by Constitution and Law. 
Accordingly, the concept of effectiveness is based in a goal-based approach or a rational 
system measured by reference to desired outcomes that the institution of the right to health 
seeks, and the timeframe in which it is reasonable to meet these goals. It means, the 
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